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I 
I. SITUATION 
 
 
 hina, one of the territorial and maritime claimants of the South China 
Sea, declared in April 2020 that it had created two new administrative dis-
tricts in the South China Sea: 
 
Xisha district, covering the Paracel Islands and Macclesfield Bank, and 
Nansha district covering the Spartly [sic] Islands . . . . The new administra-
tive districts are to be under the authority of the local government in 
Sansha, a city located on Woody Island which is administratively part of 
Hainan province. The Xisha district will be based in Sansha while the 
Nansha district will operate from Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys.1 
 
Sansha City was “established on July 24, 2012 to administer the Xisha, 
Zhongsha, and Nansha Islands and their surrounding waters in the South 
China Sea.”2 Sansha City administers nearly two million square kilometers, 
but this area currently includes only around 20 square kilometers of land.3 
As part of this process, China also named over eighty islands and other geo-
graphical features in the South China Sea, with the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
quoted as saying that the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands are “innate ter-
ritories.”4 
As part of its administration of the area, China gives its Coast Guard 
responsibility “for a wide range of missions under the umbrella of maritime 
rights protection, including enforcement of China’s sovereignty claims, sur-
veillance, protection of fisheries’ resources, anti-smuggling, and general law 
enforcement.”5 Between 2010 and the time of this writing, approximately 
                                                                                                                      
1. Huong Le Thu, Fishing While the Water is Muddy: China’s Newly Announced Administrative 
Districts in the South China Sea, ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (May 6, 2020), 
https://amti.csis.org/fishing-while-the-water-is-muddy-chinas-newly-announced-adminis-
trative-districts-in-the-south-china-sea/. 
2. Wang Xinjuan, China’s Sansha City Establishes Xisha, Nansha Districts in Major Adminis-
trative Move, MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(Apr. 18, 2020), http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2020-04/18/content_4863772.htm. 
3. Id. 
4. Beijing Names Islands in Disputed South China Sea, BARRON’S (Apr. 21, 2020), 
https://www.barrons.com/news/beijing-names-islands-in-disputed-south-china-sea-0158 
7466205. 
5. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AN-
NUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 53 (2019); see also Andrew S. Erickson, Joshua Hickey & 
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seventy major incidents occurred in the South China Sea, with “at least one 
Chinese maritime law enforcement vessel . . . involved in 73 percent of inci-
dents.”6 The incidents involving non-gray hulled Chinese ships include the 
following: 
 
1. China Coast Guard conducted “regular patrols” into Indonesia’s exclu-
sive economic zone off the coast of the northern islands of Natuna;7 
2. The flanking of Malaysian state oil company Petronas’ oil exploration 
vessel by Chinese vessels, including those from the Coast Guard;8 
3. China Coast Guard vessels rammed Philippine fishing boats9 and fre-
quently seized Filipino fishermen’s catch10 off Scarborough Shoal;  
4. China Coast Guard vessels blocked the passage of three Philippine civil-
ian vessels on a resupply mission to Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal;11  
5. China’s maritime militia and Coast Guard intermittently swarmed Phil-
ippine-occupied Thitu (Pag-asa) Island;12 and 
6. The collision with and sinking of a Vietnam fishing vessel by a Chinese 
patrol vessel in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands, reportedly due to the 
                                                                                                                      
Henry Holst, Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Forces, Capabilities, and 
Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond, 72 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW, Spring 2019, at 11. 
6. Are Maritime Law Enforcement Forces Destabilizing Asia?, CHINAPOWER (Aug. 18, 2016), 
https://chinapower.csis.org/maritime-forces-destabilizing-asia/ (last updated Apr. 3, 2020). 
7. Indonesia Protests to China over Border Intrusion Near South China Sea, REUTERS, Dec. 30, 
2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-china-southchinasea/indonesia-pro-
tests-to-china-over-border-intrusion-near-south-china-sea-idUSKBN1YY0ZW. 
8. A. Ananthalakshmi & Rozanna Latiff, Chinese and Malaysian Ships in South China Sea 
Standoff: Sources, REUTERS, Apr. 17, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-
china-southchinasea/chinese-and-malaysian-ships-in-south-china-sea-standoff-sources-
idUSKBN21Z1TN. 
9. Philippines Says Chinese Ship Rammed Fishing Boats in Scarborough Shoal, REUTERS, Feb. 
4, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-china/philippines-says-chinese-
ship-rammed-fishing-boats-in-scarborough-shoal-idUSKBN0L81IM20150204. 
10. Carmela Fonbuena, Video Captures China Coast Guard Taking PH Fishermen’s Catch, 
RAPPLER (June 7, 2018), https://www.rappler.com/nation/204383-china-coast-guard-tak-
ing-filipino-fishermen-catch-scarborough-shoal-video. 
11. Frances Mangosing, DND: China Coast Guard Blocked PH Vessels in Ayungin Shoal, 
INQUIRER (Sept. 19, 2019), https://globalnation.inquirer.net/180004/dnd-china-coast-
guard-blocked-ph-vessels-in-ayungin-shoal. 
12. Defense Chief Confirms ‘Intermittent’ Presence of Chinese Ships Near Pag-Asa Island, CNN 
PHILIPPINES (Feb. 20, 2020), https://cnnphilippines.com/news/2020/2/20/Delfin-Lo-
renzana-Chinese-ships-Pag-asa-Island.html. 
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fishing vessel’s “illegal entry” and refusal to leave after being ordered to 
do so by China’s Coast Guard.13 
 
China announced in 2011 that “actions taken by China’s competent au-
thorities are regular maritime law enforcement and surveillance activities in 
the waters under the jurisdiction of China.”14 However, on July 12, 2016, the 
Annex VII U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Arbitral Tribunal of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favor of the Philippines in the South 
China Sea Arbitration case the Philippines had brought against China.15 
Among other dispositive findings, the arbitral tribunal declared that China’s 
maritime law enforcement actions directed towards Philippine vessels and 
Filipino fishermen, including marine surveillance of Philippine ships, en-
forcement of fisheries jurisdiction over Filipino fishermen, lack of oversight 
or actual investigation of marine environmental violations by individual Chi-
nese mariners, Chinese dredgers, and other Chinese vessels, and large-scale 
reclamation and construction of artificial islands all breached China’s inter-
national legal obligations under the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention (UN-
CLOS),16 the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea,17 and general international law.18 
On July 12, the day the award was announced, China’s Foreign Ministry 
issued an official statement, declaring, inter alia, that  
 
China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the 
South China Sea shall under no circumstances be affected by those awards 
[the 12 July 2016 Award on the Merits and the 29 October 2015 Award on 
                                                                                                                      
13. Khanh Vu, Vietnam Protests Beijing’s Sinking of South China Sea Boat, REUTERS, Apr. 4, 
2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-china-southchinasea/vietnam-protests 
-beijings-sinking-of-south-china-sea-boat-idUSKBN21M072. 
14. Jiang Yu, Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s Remarks on China’s Maritime Law En-
forcement and Surveillance on the South China Sea (May 28, 2011), https://www.fmprc. 
gov.cn/ce/cgjb/eng/fyrth/t826601.htm. 
15. South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Case No. 2013-19, PCA Case Repos-
itory, Award (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016) [hereinafter SCS Award]. 
16. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]  
17. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 
20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, T.I.A.S. No. 8587, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16. 
18. SCS Award, supra note 15, ¶¶ 708–12, 716, 735–57, 805–13, 939–66, 992–93, 1043, 
1109, 1177–81, 1202. 
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Jurisdiction and Admissibility]. China opposes and will never accept any 
claim or action based on those awards.19 
 
China continues to maintain that it has “indisputable sovereignty over the 
South China Sea Islands (the Dongsha Islands, the Xisha Islands, the 
Zhongsha Islands, and the Nansha Islands) and the adjacent waters.”20 
This statement, coupled with the arbitration ruling, raises an important 
question: Are China’s unilateral maritime law enforcement activities identi-
fied above permitted under UNCLOS or applicable international law? 
 
II. SOLUTION 
 
In short, the Chinese maritime law enforcement activities identified above 
do not comply with UNCLOS and applicable international law. 
The applicable international law includes the 2016 South China Sea arbitral 
award, which is legally binding and requires China to comply with its disposi-
tif.21 As a decision of an arbitral tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion, the award is also a subsidiary source of international law.22 Among its 
dispositions, the award explicitly declares that: 
 
(1) [A]s between the Philippines and China, [UNCLOS] defines the scope 
of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, which may not extend 
beyond the limits imposed therein; 
 
                                                                                                                      
19. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Statement of the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on China’s Territorial Sovereignty and Mar-
itime Rights and Interests in the South China Sea (July 7, 2016), https://www.fmprc. 
gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379493.shtml. 
20. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Position Paper of 
the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the 
South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, ¶ 4 (Dec. 7, 2014), 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1368895.htm. 
21. UNCLOS, supra note 16, annex VII, art. 11; see also Lucy Reed & Kenneth Wong, 
Marine Entitlements in the South China Sea: The Arbitration between the Philippines and China, 110 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 746 (2016); Diane A. Desierto, Enforcement 
Options and Paths to Compliance: Disputants and Global Stakeholders in Philippines v. China, 8 
ASIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 64–75 (2018). 
22. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(d), June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 
993, 59 Stat. 1055; see also HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 136–
37 (2d ed. 2019). 
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(2) [A]s between the Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic 
rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime 
areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-
dash line’ are contrary to [UNCLOS] and without lawful effect to the ex-
tent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s mar-
itime entitlements under [UNCLOS]; . . . [UNCLOS] superseded any his-
toric rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, in excess of the limits 
imposed therein.23 
 
Accordingly, because it is bound by UNCLOS and the 2016 arbitral award, 
China cannot rely on claimed historic rights or the exercise of sovereign con-
trol or jurisdiction under its nine-dash line map to justify continuing unilat-
eral maritime law enforcement activities against Indonesia, the Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Vietnam for the type of incidents described above. 
As of this writing, China has remained opaque on the specific legal 
grounds supporting its conduct of maritime law enforcement activities in the 
South China Sea, but there are public indications that China continues to 
reject the applicability of UNCLOS to the South China Sea disputes, and, 
likewise, maintains its territorial and maritime claims over the entirety of the 
area within the nine-dash line, again based on claimed historic rights.24 With 
respect to Chinese Coast Guard vessels entering Indonesia’s exclusive eco-
nomic zone off the coast of the northern Natuna Islands, China’s Foreign 
Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang stated in December 2019 that: 
 
China has sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and has sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction over relevant waters near the Nansha Islands. In the mean-
time, China has historical rights in the South China Sea. Chinese fishermen 
have long been engaging in fishery activities in relevant waters near the 
Nansha Islands, which has all along been legal and legitimate. The China 
Coast Guard were performing their duty by carrying out routine patrol to 
maintain maritime order and protect our people’s legitimate rights and in-
terests in the relevant waters. Our ambassador to Indonesia reiterated 
China’s consistent position to the Indonesian side.25 
                                                                                                                      
23. SCS Award, supra note 15, ¶¶ 1203(B)(1)–(B)(2). 
24. See Robert Vergara, China Rejects PH Arbitral Victory on South China Sea Anew, CNN 
PHILIPPINES (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2019/8/30/pres 
dient-rodrigo-duterte-xi-jinping-bilateral-meeting-hague-ruling-south-china-sea.html. 
25. Geng Shuang, Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic 
of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on De-
cember 31, 2019 (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s 
2510_665401/2511_665403/t1729013.shtml. 
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The same spokesperson later alluded to the position that “China had sover-
eignty over the Spratly Islands and their waters and both China and Indone-
sia have ‘normal’ fishing activities there.”26 He ambiguously stated: 
 
China has sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction over the relevant waters. Our position is in accordance with 
international law. In the meantime, I’d like to stress that China and Indo-
nesia don’t have disputes over territorial sovereignty, though we have over-
lapping claims of maritime rights and interests in some areas in the South 
China Sea.27 
 
China has taken similar positions relative to its recent maritime surveil-
lance and law enforcement activities in Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone, 
alleging these are “normal activities.”28 China also based its maritime law en-
forcement activities involving Vietnam on Chinese sovereignty, stating in 
April 2020 that it was simply curbing “illegal activities in Chinese waters” 
when a Vietnamese fishing vessel “rammed into [China Coast Guard ship 
4301] and sunk” off the disputed Paracel Islands.29 Vietnam rejected China’s 
version of events, promptly producing a video of a large Chinese vessel chas-
ing and ramming the wooden fishing boat.30 
Most recently, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian de-
clared that China was not discounting the possibility of establishing an air 
defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea, noting “[i]n 
                                                                                                                      
26. Indonesia Boosts Patrols after Chinese Boat ‘Trespasses’ in Its Waters, REUTERS, Jan. 3, 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-china-southchinasea/indonesia-boosts-pa-
trols-after-chinese-boat-trespasses-in-its-waters-idUSKBN1Z217I. 
27. Geng Shuang, Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic 
of China, Press Conference Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press 
Conference on January 8, 2020 (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_ 
665399/s2510_665401/t1730335.shtml. 
28. Rozanna Latiff, Chinese Ship Leaves Malaysian Waters after Month-Long South China Sea 
Standoff, REUTERS, May 15, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-ma-
laysia/chinese-ship-leaves-malaysian-waters-after-month-long-south-china-sea-standoff-
idUSKBN22R1SN. 
29. Mimi Lau, China Says Vietnamese Fishing Boat Rammed Coastguard Ship Before Sinking, 
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/mili-
tary/article/3078452/china-says-vietnamese-fishing-boat-rammed-coastguard-ship. 
30. Vietnam Airs Video of Chinese Ship Sinking Fishing Boat in South China Sea, SOUTH 
CHINA MORNING POST, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1526701/vietnam-
airs-video-chinese-ship-sinking-fishing-boat-south-china-sea (last visited Aug. 6, 2020). 
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the light of the air security threats China faces above relevant waters of the 
South China Sea, China will carefully and prudently study the issue taking 
into account all factors.”31 This statement suggests that China anchors its 
legal authority to conduct maritime law enforcement activities on its claim 
to all the maritime and territorial areas covered under its nine-dash line map. 
Such a claim openly contravenes China’s obligations under the 2016 arbitral 
award not to draw any maritime entitlements from the map,32 as well as, by 
implication, not to conduct maritime law enforcement activities premised on 
maritime entitlements that are (in the tribunal’s words) “without lawful ef-
fect”33 and thus violate UNCLOS. 
Moreover, China’s unilateral conduct of alleged maritime law enforce-
ment activities in disputed areas in the South China Sea also thwarts its bind-
ing legal commitments to cooperate under the 2002 Declaration on the Con-
duct of Parties in the South China Sea,34 which specifically requires that all 
claimants cooperate on enforcement activities relating to marine environ-
mental protection, marine scientific research, safety of navigation and com-
munication at sea, search and rescue operations, and combatting transna-
tional crimes such as drug trafficking, piracy, arms trafficking, and armed 
robbery at sea.35 The same Declaration states that parties to the disputes 
would “undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that 
would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.”36 Pend-
ing the negotiated delimitation of overlapping exclusive economic zones and 
continental shelves, China also has the legal duty under UNCLOS to coop-
erate with all parties “to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the 
reaching of the final agreement.”37 
Maritime law enforcement activities conducted outside the UNCLOS le-
gal framework hamper efforts to reach final maritime delimitation agree-
ments between the several claimant States to the South China Sea. This is 
precisely why at the 36th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
                                                                                                                      
31. US Watching if Beijing Declares Air Defense Zone in South China Sea, RADIO FREE ASIA 
(June 24, 2020), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/usa-adiz-06242020155414.html. 
32. SCS Award, supra note 15, ¶ 278. 
33. Id. 
34. Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, Brunei-Cambodia-
China-Indon.-Laos-Malay.-Myan.-Phil.-Sing.-Thai.-Viet., Nov. 4, 2002, https://asean.org/? 
static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2. 
35. Id. ¶ 6. 
36. Id. ¶ 5. 
37. UNCLOS, supra note 16, arts. 74(3), 83(3). 
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Summit on June 26, 2020, all ten member States declared that UNCLOS is 
the basis for determining maritime entitlements, sovereign rights, jurisdic-
tion, and legitimate interests over maritime zones: 
 
We reaffirmed the importance of maintaining and promoting peace, secu-
rity, stability, safety and freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the 
South China Sea and recognized the benefits of having the South China 
Sea as a sea of peace, stability, and prosperity. We underscored the im-
portance of the full and effective implementation of the 2002 Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in its entirety. 
We were encouraged by the progress of the substantive negotiations to-
wards the early conclusion of an effective and substantive Code of Conduct 
in the South China Sea (COC) consistent with international law, including 
the 1982 UNCLOS. We welcomed the completion of the first reading of 
the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text. We emphasized the need to main-
tain and promote an environment conducive to the COC negotiations, and 
thus welcomed practical measures that could reduce tensions and the risk 
of accidents, misunderstandings and miscalculation. We stressed the im-
portance of undertaking confidence building and preventive measures to 
enhance, among others, trust and confidence amongst parties; and we re-
affirmed the importance of upholding international law, including the 1982 
UNCLOS. 
 
We discussed the situation in the South China Sea, during which concerns 
were expressed on the land reclamations, recent developments, activities 
and serious incidents, which have eroded trust and confidence, increased 
tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region. We 
reaffirmed the need to enhance mutual trust and confidence, exercise self-
restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate dis-
putes and affect peace and stability and avoid actions that may further com-
plicate the situation, and pursue peaceful resolution of disputes in accord-
ance with universally recognized principles of international law, including 
the 1982 UNCLOS. We reaffirmed that the 1982 UNCLOS is the basis for deter-
mining maritime entitlements, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests over 
maritime zones, and the 1982 UNCLOS sets out the legal framework within which 
all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out. We emphasized the im-
portance of non-militarization and self-restraint in the conduct of all activ-
ities by claimants and all other states, including those mentioned in the 
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DOC that could further complicate the situation and escalate tensions in 
the South China Sea.38 
 
China’s recent assertions of supposed maritime law enforcement activi-
ties taken by its Coast Guard, as well as other components of its maritime 
militia,39 against ships, vessels, and crew from Malaysia, the Philippines, In-
donesia, and Vietnam should therefore be evaluated under UNCLOS’s pro-
visions, as well as the principle of good faith in the settlement of disputes 
under general international law.40 The Manila Declaration on the Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes requires States parties to international disputes to 
 
refrain from any action whatsoever which may aggravate the situation so 
as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and 
make more difficult or impede the peaceful settlement of the dispute, and 
shall act in this respect in accordance with the purposes and principles of 
the United Nations.41 
 
China and all other South China Sea claimants currently in the process of 
negotiating the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea share the duty to 
negotiate in good faith: 
 
The principle of good faith requires the parties to start the process of ne-
gotiations . . . with sincerity, to conduct the discussions meaningfully; not 
to prematurely abandon the process; in case of an objective failure of the 
process to attempt to resolve the dispute with another mode – and requires 
parties to implement the judgment in good faith.42 
 
                                                                                                                      
38. Chairman’s Statement of the 36th ASEAN Summit ¶¶ 64–65, June 26, 2020, 
https://asean.org/storage/2020/06/Chairman-Statement-of-the-36th-ASEAN-Summit-
FINAL.pdf (emphasis added). 
39. Id. ¶ 65; see also Jonathan G. Odom, Where Gray Zone Meets Black Letter: China’s Para-
naval Strategy and International Law, in CHINA’S MARITIME GRAY ZONE OPERATIONS (An-
drew S. Erickson & Ryan D. Martinson eds., 2019). 
40. Andreas R. Ziegler & Jorun Baumgartner, Good Faith as a General Principle of (Interna-
tional) Law, in GOOD FAITH AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 10 (Andrew D. Mitch-
ell, M. Sornarajah & Tania Voon eds., 2015). 
41. G.A. Res. 37/10, annex, Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes, ¶ 8 (Nov. 5, 1982). 
42. KAREL WELLENS, NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE 29 (2014). 
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Unilaterally conducted maritime law enforcement activities, when done out-
side the cooperative duties and jurisdictional limits provided for under the 
UNCLOS framework, undermine the requirements of good faith in negoti-
ations over the South China Sea disputes. 
Whether China asserts its legal authority to engage in maritime law en-
forcement activities against other South China Sea claimants’ ships, vessels, 
or mariners through China’s capacity as a coastal State, port State, or flag 
State, UNCLOS should remain the legal instrument for China’s legal justifi-
cations, rather than unilateral assertions of sovereignty to conduct such ac-
tivities. While UNCLOS does not contain an explicit definition of the scope 
of maritime law enforcement activities,43 many of its provisions apply to dif-
ferent law enforcement situations and maritime security threats at sea.44 
Ships and other vessels on the high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of their respective flag States,45 with flag States bearing specific duties 
to “effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, tech-
nical, and social matters over ships flying its flag”;46 to “take such measures 
for ships flying its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea”;47 as well as 
to enforce “applicable international rules and standards.”48 A coastal State 
can exercise its law enforcement jurisdiction over ships in its ports49 and in-
ternal waters,50 only for matters that are not essentially internal to the ship, 
which remain under the jurisdiction of the flag State, or for matters that af-
fect its interests as a port State.51 Port States can subject vessels that are vol-
untarily in port to investigations, and, if warranted by the evidence, “institute 
proceedings in respect of any discharge from that vessel outside the internal 
waters, territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of that State in violation 
                                                                                                                      
43. See Brian Wilson, Human Rights and Maritime Law Enforcement, 52 STANFORD JOUR-
NAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 243, 244 n.4 (2016). 
44. NATALIE KLEIN, MARITIME SECURITY AND LAW OF THE SEA 62–63 (2011). 
45. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 92(1). 
46. Id. art. 94(1). 
47. Id. art. 94(3). 
48. Id. art. 217(1)–(4). 
49. Id. art. 11. 
50. Id. art. 8. 
51. See, e.g., Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing arts. 11–15, 18, opened for signature Nov. 22, 2009, 129 
Stat. 664, 55 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1157, 1159 (2016) (entered into force 
June 5, 2016) (describing various law enforcement actions that the port State can undertake 
to address IUU fishing activities). 
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of applicable international rules and standards established through the com-
petent international organization or general diplomatic conference.”52 Be-
yond a State’s ports and internal waters, special jurisdictional rules in UN-
CLOS apply to law enforcement activities within the maritime zones of the 
territorial sea,53 contiguous zone,54 and exclusive economic zone.55 Where 
maritime law enforcement involves some degree of interference with foreign 
vessels, McLaughlin rightly argues that certain preconditions extant from 
UNCLOS must be met:  
 
(a) the coastal State has enacted a law that applies to the conduct which the 
[maritime law enforcement] agent is using as the basis for their actions in 
relation to a particular suspect vessel; (b) the coastal State has authority to 
regulate that conduct in the maritime zone where the suspect vessel is lo-
cated; (c) the [maritime law enforcement] agent is authorized under their 
coastal State’s law to take maritime action against that suspect vessel, in 
relation to that suspected breach, in that maritime zone; and (d) there is no 
legal limitation . . . to the application of the coastal State’s law to the vessel 
and people that are the target of the coastal State’s [maritime law enforce-
ment] action.56 
 
Applying UNCLOS and relevant international law to the six situations 
identified above where China asserted its sovereignty and jurisdiction to con-
duct maritime law enforcement activities against ships, vessels, or mariners 
of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, the following points 
must be considered in further evaluating China’s maritime law enforcement 
activities. 
First, China has not clarified whether it has any overlapping exclusive 
economic zones with Indonesia, although one of the dashes in the nine-dash 
line “slices through waters north of the Natunas. . . . While Beijing recognizes 
Indonesian sovereignty over the Natunas themselves, the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry describes the nearby sea as China’s ‘traditional fishing grounds.’”57 
                                                                                                                      
52. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 218(1). 
53. Id. arts. 2, 21, 24, 25, 27, 220(2)–(6); see also KLEIN, supra note 44, at 74–84. 
54. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 33. 
55. Id. arts. 55–75. 
56. Rob McLaughlin, Authorizations for Maritime Law Enforcement Operations, 98 INTER-
NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 465, 467–68 (2016). 
57. Hannah Beech & Muktita Suhartono, China Chases Indonesia’s Fishing Fleets, Staking 
Claims to Sea’s Riches, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 31, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/ 
03/31/world/asia/Indonesia-south-china-sea-fishing.html. 
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In this regard, one should recall the arbitral tribunal’s clarification that under 
UNCLOS, traditional fishing rights are accorded different treatment across 
maritime zones: 
 
(a) In archipelagic waters, traditional fishing rights are expressly protected, 
and Article 51(1) of the Convention provides that ‘an archipelagic State 
shall respect existing agreements with other States and shall recognize tra-
ditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities of the immediately ad-
jacent neighbouring States in certain areas falling within archipelagic wa-
ters.’ 
 
(b) In the exclusive economic zone, in contrast, traditional fishing rights are 
extinguished, except insofar as Article 62(3) specifies that ‘the need to mini-
mize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished 
in the zone’ shall constitute one of the factors to be taken into account by 
the coastal State in giving access to any surplus in the allowable catch. The 
Tribunal considers that the inclusion of this provision – which would be 
entirely unnecessary if traditional fishing rights were preserved in the ex-
clusive economic zone – confirms that the drafters of the Convention did 
not intend to preserve such rights. The Convention does not, of course, 
preclude that States may continue to recognize traditional fishing rights in 
the exclusive economic zone in their legislation, in bilateral fisheries access 
agreements, or through regional fisheries management organizations. Such 
recognition would, in most instances, be commendable, but it is not re-
quired by the Convention, except to the extent specified in Article 62(3).58 
 
Moreover, as the tribunal held, traditional fishing rights “are not the his-
toric rights of States . . . but private rights.”59 China’s characterization of 
patrols in the Natuna Islands as part of its maritime law enforcement activi-
ties is thus immaterial since any such private rights to traditional fishing 
grounds in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone had long been extinguished 
under UNCLOS except to the extent provided in Article 62(3) therein. Un-
surprisingly, Indonesia invoked the South China Sea arbitral award at the 
United Nations in 2020, to reiterate that “no maritime feature in the Spratly 
Islands is entitled to an exclusive economic zone or a continental shelf of its 
own.”60Second, China is reported to have maintained a  
                                                                                                                      
58. SCS Award, supra note 15, ¶¶ 804(a)–(b) (emphasis added). 
59. Id. ¶ 798. 
60. In Rare Move, Indonesia Raises Hague Ruling vs China, INTELLASIA (May 29, 2020), 
https://www.intellasia.net/in-rare-move-indonesia-raises-hague-ruling-vs-china-783461. 
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near-constant presence at Luconia Shoals off the coast of Malaysia’s Sara-
wak State. . . . The reefs, which are divided into the North and South Lu-
conia Shoals, are located between the hotly contested Spratly Islands to the 
north and James Shoal, which China often calls its southernmost territory, 
to the south. Like James Shoal, the Luconia Shoals are underwater at high-
tide, meaning they cannot be claimed as territory and constitute part of 
Malaysia’s continental shelf.61 
 
In April 2020, a Chinese government surveillance ship, the Haiyang Dizhi 8, 
was reportedly accompanied by Chinese Coast Guard vessels as it was “tag-
ging” a Malaysian oil exploration vessel, the West Capella, about 324 kilo-
meters from the Malaysian coast and within Malaysia’s exclusive economic 
zone.62 
Such incidents require further investigation to determine the nature of 
China’s asserted maritime law enforcement or maritime surveillance activity 
within Malaysia’s exclusive economic zone, and the resultant consequences 
on Malaysia’s enjoyment of its coastal State rights. Applying Article 58 of 
UNCLOS, China retains enjoyment of the freedoms of navigation and over-
flight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other interna-
tionally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms.63 But China also 
must observe due regard for the rights of the coastal State. As provided in 
Article 58(3) of UNCLOS: 
 
States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and 
shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of in-
ternational law insofar as they are not incompatible with this Part.64 
 
The obligation to give “due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal 
State” was interpreted in the 2015 award in the Chagos Marine Protected Area 
arbitration, in which the tribunal stressed  
 
                                                                                                                      
61. Tracking China’s Coast Guard Off Borneo, ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE 
(Apr. 5, 2017), https://amti.csis.org/tracking-chinas-coast-guard-off-borneo/. 
62. A. Ananthalakshmi & Rozanna Latiff, Chinese and Malaysian Ships in South China Sea 
Standoff, REUTERS, Apr. 17, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/malaysia-china-south-
chinasea/chinese-and-malaysian-ships-in-south-china-sea-standoff-sources-idUSL4N2C52GL. 
63. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 58(1). 
64. Id. art. 58(3). 
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the extent of the regard required by the Convention will depend upon the 
nature of the rights held by Mauritius [the coastal State], their importance, 
the extent of the anticipated impairment, the nature and importance of the 
activities contemplated by the United Kingdom [the State acting in another 
State’s exclusive economic zone] and the availability of alternative ap-
proaches. In the majority of cases, this assessment will necessarily involve 
at least some consultation with the rights-holding State.65 
 
In the Arctic Sunrise arbitration, the arbitral tribunal emphasized, “the 
protection of a coastal State’s sovereign rights is a legitimate aim that allows 
it to take appropriate measures for that purpose. Such measures must fulfil 
the tests of reasonableness, necessity, and proportionality.”66 The South China 
Sea arbitration tribunal stressed that “anything less than due diligence by a 
State in preventing its nationals from unlawfully fishing in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone of another State would fall short the regard due pursuant to 
article 58(3) of [UNCLOS].”67 
Third, with respect to China’s maritime law enforcement activities di-
rected at Philippine ships and vessels, China is bound by its obligations under 
UNCLOS and as specifically resolved in the dispositif of the South China Sea 
award. The ramming of Filipino boats in Scarborough Shoal or the seizure 
of the Filipino fishermen’s catch from Scarborough Shoal are inconsistent 
with the arbitral tribunal’s finding that China, “through the operation of its 
official vessels at Scarborough Shoal from May 2012 onwards, unlawfully 
prevented Filipino fishermen from engaging in traditional fishing at Scar-
borough Shoal . . . without prejudice to the question of sovereignty over 
Scarborough Shoal.”68 The seizure of the Filipino fishermen’s catch is pa-
tently unlawful and contrary to UNCLOS, which specifically grants States 
such rights of seizure of property only in cases of piracy.69 
Fourth, the legality of China’s blocking of resupply ships to Second 
Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal can also be determined by reference to the findings 
of the South China Sea arbitral award, which categorically found that the shoal 
                                                                                                                      
65. Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), Case No. 2011-03, PCA Case 
Repository, Award, ¶ 15 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015). 
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“is a low-tide elevation within the exclusive economic zone of the Philip-
pines.”70 While the arbitral tribunal declined jurisdiction on this issue due to 
the military activities exception under UNCLOS Article 298(1)(b),71 China’s 
asserted maritime law enforcement actions in blocking the resupply ships 
must be assessed given the due regard owed to the Philippines’ rights and 
duties as a coastal State under UNCLOS Article 58(3).72 Moreover, deliber-
ately cutting off access to Filipinos’ food and other supplies could violate 
China’s international human rights obligations to, among others, respect and 
protect rights to health, food, and an adequate standard of living as a party 
to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.73 
As to the swarming of Chinese Coast Guard and other maritime militia 
vessels of Thitu (Pag-asa) Island in the Spratly Islands, the tribunal legally 
characterized Thitu as a rock under UNCLOS Article 121.74 As such, it is 
entitled to a territorial sea but it cannot generate entitlements to an exclusive 
economic zone or continental shelf.75 The Philippines, as the coastal State, is 
in effective possession of this high-tide feature. Thus, because the twelve 
nautical mile territorial sea surrounding Thitu Island is subject to the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the Philippines, the actions of the Chinese vessels violated 
Philippine sovereignty. 
Finally, China’s alleged maritime law enforcement of fisheries jurisdic-
tion leading to the ramming and sinking of a Vietnamese wooden fishing 
boat off the Paracel Islands (an area in dispute between China and Vietnam) 
at the very least violates UNCLOS Articles 74(3) and 83(3), which impose 
duties to cooperate and to avoid actions that would hamper reaching final 
agreement between the parties as to the delimitation of overlapping exclusive 
economic zones and continental shelves. With regard to the incident itself, 
analysis of its lawfulness must await ascertainment of China’s claimed legal 
authority for exercising jurisdiction in the disputed area; the circumstances 
that necessitated this particular use of force against a Vietnamese wooden 
                                                                                                                      
70. SCS Award, supra note 15, ¶ 1153. 
71. Id. ¶ 1162. 
72. UNCLOS, supra note 16, art. 58(3) (“In exercising their rights and performing their 
duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard 
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fishing boat; the proportionality of the use of force, as well as the reasona-
bleness of the outright destruction of property in allegedly enforcing Chinese 
fisheries law without prior recourse to procedures required under that law.76 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, there is no legal basis for China’s assertion of sovereignty and his-
toric rights as justification for maritime law enforcement activities through-
out the maritime and territorial areas within the nine-dash line map. The 
South China Sea arbitral award disposed of the map as “without legal effect” 
and contrary to UNCLOS. Likewise, the 2020 ASEAN 36th Ministerial 
Statement unanimously reaffirmed the applicability of UNCLOS to the gov-
ernance, jurisdiction, and determination of maritime entitlements in the 
South China Sea. Pending negotiations on overlapping maritime entitle-
ments with other South China Sea claimants, China is bound to ensure that 
its maritime law enforcement activities conform to UNCLOS and interna-
tional law. 
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